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appell.aifi b st e- ar 
by Andrew S. Pollis 
m;ffiilyzing a New Era in Ohio,s Appellate Courts 
As reported in this column in June, sig-
nificant amendments to R.C. 2505.02-
the statute defining the term "final order" 
for purposes of appellate review- became 
effective July 22, I998, dawning a new era 
in Ohio's appellate jurisprudence. Parties 
may now appeal certain orders that, until 
now, were deemed interlocutory and car-
ried no right of appellate review until the 
end of the case in the trial court. 
However, the statute raises so many ques-
tions about its practical application, par-
ticularly with respect to orders granting 
or denying provisional remedies, that it 
will be months, perhaps even years, 
before the dust finally settles. In the 
meantime, litigators will have to wade 
through mostly uncharted territory. 
There are four significant topics that are 
likely to be debated as our new system 
unfolds: (I) the new jurisdictional 
scheme for appeals of orders granting or 
denying provisional remedies under sec-
tion (B)( 4) of the statute; (2) the inter-
play between the new statute and Civ.R. 
54(B ); ( 3) the practical difficulties 
involved in determining appellate juris-
diction under section (B)( 4 ); and ( 4) the 
effect the new classes of appeals will have 
on trial court jurisdiction. 
Provisional Remedies 
Contrary to popular misconception, the 
new statute does not permit immediate 
appeal from any trial court order at any 
stage of the proceedings. The defmition 
of "provisional remedy" is vague and 
broad but not all-encompassing. 
Furthermore, orders granting or denying 
provisional remedies are only "final" 
under carefully circumscribed criteria set 
forth in section (B)( 4) of the statute. 
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Section (A)(3) defmes "provisional rem-
edy" as "a proceeding ancillary to an 
action, including, but not limited to, a pro-
ceeding for a preliminary injunction, 
attachment, discovery of a privileged mat-
ter, or suppression of evidence" (emphasis 
added). The highlighted language must 
mean that there are provisional remedies 
cognizable under the statute other than 
those specifically listed. But how far will 
courts be willing to go? Does the defmi-
tion include the denial of a motion to dis-
miss? Does it include the setting of dead-
lines for production of expert reports - or 
the refusal to extend deadlines? 
Discovery orders may spawn the greatest 
debate. Given the specific inclusion of 
"discovery of a privileged matter," are we 
to assume that the term excludes discov-
ery of a non-privileged matter? While the 
courts are likely to reign in discovery-
related appeals simply to control the vol-
ume of cases, a blanket rule that the dis-
pute must involve a privilege to quality as 
a provisional remedy may be too restric-
tive in some circumstances. This may be 
true when work product is involved or 
when the trial court grossly abuses its dis-
cretion in awarding or denying discovery. 
Fitting within the definition of a provi-
sional remedy is only the beginning of 
the jurisdictional challenge. Under sec-
tion (B)( 4 ), an order granting or denying 
a provisional remedy must overcome two 
additional hurdles to quality as a final 
order. Both of the following must apply: 
(a)The order in effect determines the 
action with respect to the provisional 
remedy and prevents a judgment in the 
action in favor of the appealing party 
with respect to the provisional remedy. 
(b )The appealing party would not be 
afforded a meaningful or efft;ctive rem-
edy by an appeal following fmal judg-
ment as to all proceedings, issues, 
claims and parties in the action. 
The phrase "prevents a judgment ... with 
respect to the provisional remedy," found 
in section (B)(4)(a), may prove to be an 
impassible hurdle tor certain would-be 
appellants. The language suggests that 
the order is not appealable so long as 
"the trial court could still revise its previ-
ous judgment." See Chif Italiano -...Corp. v. 
Kmt State Univ. (I989), 44 Ohio St.3d 86, 
90, fn.6 (interpreting Civ.R. 54(B)). For 
example, a trial court that initially denies 
a request for preliminary injunction still 
retains the right to grant it later. Arguably, 
there could be no immediate appeal in 
that situation, although practically speak-
ing, the movant would have lost the bene-
fit of an immediate injunction. 
Thus, from a strategic standpoint, a 
party seeking relief may wish to frame 
the request with a time parameter (e.g., 
"immediate preliminary injunction") so 
that the denial of the request would 
inherently "prevent[] a judgment" of 
the specific relief requested. In any event, 
once a party is forced to take action 
(e.g., produce documents) or to refrain 
from taking action (e.g., obey an injunc-
tion), then they have certainly reached the 
appealable point of no return. But if that 
becomes the test under subsection (a), 
what is the distinction between subsec-
tion (a) and the "meaningful or effective 
remedy" reqmrement of section 
(B)( 4)(b )? 
Section (B)( 4 )(b), the cat-out-of-the-bag 
test, is more straightforward. If appellate 
rev1ew of an order is deferred until the 
final disposition of the entire case, will the 
issue have become moot? If so, then the 
criterion of subsection (b) is probably sat-
isfied. This is an important requirement 
because, without it, the proceedings of the 
trial court could be interrupted by multi-
ple appeals, even in the middle of trial, 
merely for purposes of delay. See Dayton 
Hlc>men~ Health C11: v. Enix (1990), 52 Ohio 
St.3d 67, 75 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
One area of potential controversy under 
subsection (b) is whether avoiding the cost 
of litigation is a legitimate ground for 
seeking an immediate appeal. Deferring 
appellate review until the end of the case 
will frequently require a party to engage in 
costly litigation that might otherwise be 
avoided. For example, a foreign defendant 
seeking to appeal the denial of a motion to 
dismiss on jurisdictional grounds certainly 
has a good argument in this regard. On the 
other hand, if avoiding litigation costs is 
always a legitimate argument under subsec-
tion (b), then almost every appellant can 
arguably meet the subsection (b) criterion. 
Applicability of Civ.R. 54(B) 
An order adjudicating "one or more but 
few~r than all of the claims or parties" is not 
"fmal" unless it is accompanied by the 
"magic language" from Civ.R. 54(B), that 
there is "no just reason for delay." Chef 
Italiano, 44 Ohio St.3d at 87-88. But the 
threshold question is whether, even under 
Chef Italiano, Rule 54(B) is "applicable" to 
either of the two new categories of fmal 
orders under the statute. See id., syllabus. 
The two new categories are orders involv-
ing certain provisional remedies (section 
(B)( 4 )) and orders determining whether 
an action may be maintained as a class 
action (section (B)( 5)). Many litigators 
instinctively, but incorrectly, assume that 
Rule 54(B) does apply, since these new 
categories will typically involve orders 
issued before fmal judgment in the case. 
"[T]he words 'claim for relief,' as used in 
Civ.R. 54(B), are synonymous with 'cause 
of action."' (Amato v. Gmeral Motors Corp. 
(I98I), 67 Ohio St.2d 253, 256.) Thus, 
in Amato, the Supreme Court specifically 
held that Rule 54(B) did not apply to 
orders certifying that an action may be 
maintained as a class action, because the 
"procedural mechanism" of class action 
certification was not, in and of itself, a 
"claim for relief' ld. 
Amato was overruled by Polikoff v. Adam 
(1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 100, but on dif-
ferent grounds (see Appellate Side Bar, 
June Bar Journal, page 28). There is no rea-
son to suspect that the Supreme Court 
would depart from its interpretation of 
Rule 54(B) as articulated in Amato. While 
Amato dealt with an order granting class 
action certification, the same reasoning 
would apply to orders, now final under 
R.C. 2505.02(B)( 4 ), granting or denying 
certain provisional remedies. 
Nevertheless, the Rule 54(B) 1ssue may 
still warrant careful consideration when 
drafting the initial pleadings. Some courts, 
especially in the new statute's infancy, may 
look to the pleadings in determining 
whether an order granting or denying a 
provisional remedy in fact resolves a 
"claim for relief" The unwary lawyer-
one whose complaint, for example, styles a 
request for preliminary injunctive relief as 
a separate cause of action - may find the 
court of appeals unwilling to hear an 
appeal from the denial of the requested 
injunction absent the magic language. On 
the other hand, the crafty lawyer, confi-
dent of winning a preliminary injunction, 
will purposely frame the pleadings in that 
fashion in an effort (however disingenuous) 
to prevent an immediate appeal. Of course, 
we would hope that the courts of appeals 
will look past the form of the complaint, but 
a careful pleader can avoid being the victim 
of an appellate court's foreseeable mistake. 
One final twist to ponder: Rule 54(B) and 
the jurisdictional puzzle of provisional 
remedies may intersect. Where Rule 54(B) 
applies, does section (B)( 4) of the new 
statute permit an immediate appeal from a 
trial court's refusal to issue the magic lan-
guage? Space constraints preclude an analy-
sis of that issue. 
Determining Appellate Jurisdiction 
Substance aside, a major issue the appel-
late courts will have to resolve is what 
procedure to follow for determining 
whether appellate jurisdiction is proper. 
Under the old statute, the right of appellate 
review was usually clear, and when disputes 
arose, they were rare enough co address case 
by case. But now, with so many potential 
disputes certain to develop under section 
(B)( 4), and with murky criteria for resolv-
ing them, the jurisdictional determination 
presents difficult practical problems. At 
what point - and with what input or argu-
ment from the parties - will the appellate 
courts determine whether jurisdiction is 
proper?. Perhaps one solution is to require 
every notice of appeal under section (B)( 4) 
to be accompanied by a jurisdictional state-
ment, on the basis of which the court could 
determine whether to allow or dismiss the 
appeal. However the procedure is orga-
nized, appellate courts will require more 
time to reach the merits of these cases, 
thus further delaying the trial court pro-
ceedings that have been interrupted by 
the appeal (see below). 
Trial Court Jurisdiction 
We can probably expect some harangues 
over the effect these new rights of appeal 
have on the continuing jurisdiction of trial 
courts. "The trial court retains all juris-
diction that is consistent with the review-
ing court's jurisdiction to reverse, modify, 
or affirm the judgment." Stale, ex rei. A&D 
Ltd. Partnership, v. Keefe (I 996), 77 Ohio 
St.3d 50, 52. So, in each appeal under sec-
tion (B)( 4) or (B)( 5) of the new statute, 
there could be disputes over whether, and 
to what extent, the proceedings in the trial 
court can continue - especially when the 
trial court views the appeal as frivolous. 
Will we see, as in Keefe, complaints for 
writs of prohibition against trial judges 
who refuse to halt proceedings pending 
appeal? These complaints would be filed 
as original actions in the courts of appeal, 
so the fall-out from the new statute may 
prove to be an even greater burden on our 
appellate courts. 
We will keep you posted in this column as 
appellate practice under the new R.C. 
2505.02 evolves. Stay tuned. 
Andrew 5. Pol/is is a partmr at Hahn Loeser & Parks 
Il.P, where he chairs the firm's Appellate Practice Group. 
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